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Abstract
While monotonicity is a necessary and almost suﬃcient condition for Nash imple-
mentation and often a demanding one, almost any (non-monotonic, for instance) social
choice rule can be implemented using undominated Nash or subgame perfect equilib-
rium. By requiring solution concepts to have closed graph in the limit of complete
information, Chung and Ely (2003) show that only monotonic social choice rules can
be implemented in the closure of the undominated Nash equilibrium correspondence.
In this paper, we show that only monotonic social choice rules can be implemented in
the closure of the subgame perfect equilibrium/sequential equilibrium correspondence.
Our robustness result helps understand the limits of subgame pefect implementation,
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literature on incomplete contracts.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that the society has a social choice rule which associates with each environment
a subset of possible outcomes. The theory of implementation is concerned with charac-
terizing the relationship between the structure of the institution (or mechanism) through
which individuals interact and the outcome of that interaction, given a social choice rule
and a domain of environments.
Maskin (1999) shows a condition called monotonicity is necessary and almost suﬃcient
for Nash implementation. It turns out that monotonicity is quite a demanding condition
and the literature tried to obtain less restrictive characterizations using reﬁnements of
Nash equilibrium. Using subgame perfect equilibrium, Moore and Repullo (1988) dispense
with monotonicity and provide a suﬃcient condition for subgame perfect implementation.1
As a diﬀerent reﬁnement, Palfrey and Srivastva (1991) propose undominated Nash equilib-
rium and prove that almost any social choice rule is implementable in undominated Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, allowing for the use of reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium, one can
signiﬁcantly expand the class of implementable social choice rules.
Chung and Ely (2003) investigate the robustness of undominated Nash implementation
to incomplete information.2 In so doing, they require that solution concepts have closed
graph in the limit of complete information. Then, Chung and Ely (2003) conclude that
when preferences are strict (or more generally hedonic), only monotonic social choice rules
can be implemented in the closure of the undominated Nash equilibrium correspondence.
Following the approach by Chung and Ely (2003), this paper investigates the robustness
of any subgame perfect implementing mechanism to incomplete information. We show
that only monotonic social choice rules can be implemented in the closure of the subgame
perfect/sequential equilibrium correspondence. Hence, our result implies that there might
be little diﬀerence between sequential mechanisms and static mechanisms, once we insist
on robustness. This is due to the fact that a small amount of incomplete information
expands the set of consistent beliefs of players along the game tree and so allows to
1Abreu and Sen (1990) further reﬁne the analysis of Moore and Repullo (1988) and obtain a necessary
and almost suﬃcient condition for subgame perfect implementation. Finally, Vartiainen (2007) obtains a
full characterization.
2The type of perturbation used in Chung and Ely (2003) weakens common knowledge into common
p-belief with p close to 1. Common p-belief is introduced in Monderer and Samet (1989). This is a
“smaller”perturbation and less demanding than the one used for instance in Oury and Tercieux (2009).
See also Kunimoto (2008) for a characterization of the perturbation used in this paper.
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sustain additional sequential equilibria. The failure of monotonicity allows us to turn a
“bad” Nash outcome into a “bad” sequential equilibrium outcome. Related observations
have been made in the game theory literature by Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988).
While similar in spirit, we make a very distinct argument. In this paper, we ﬁx the payoﬀ
space and perturb only agents’ beliefs over the ﬁxed payoﬀ space. This guarantees that
the set of messages in the mechanism remains cheap-talk. Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine
(1988), on the other hand, are concerned with the situation in which the set of payoﬀ
states is not common knowledge, i.e., there are “crazy” types.
We put our result in a broader perspective. Since the early works of Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), the incomplete contracts literature often cites inde-
scribable contingencies as a major obstacle to the creation of complete contracts. Maskin
and Tirole (1999a,b), however, argue that the literature’s justiﬁcation for incomplete con-
tracts is conceptually problematic. Using the agents’ minimum foresight concerning the
possible payoﬀ contingencies, they show that the inability to describe future contingencies
by itself places no constraints on contracting. This is the so-called irrelevance theorem.
To show this, Maskin and Tirole (1999a) reduce their task to checking suﬃcient con-
ditions for subgame perfect implementation. Then, our result enables us to assess the
robustness of Maskin and Tirole’s irrelevance theorem. In fact, we can conclude that their
implementing mechanism is not robust because a small amount of incomplete information
necessitates that we should focus only on monotonic social choice rules. The paper by
Moore and Repullo (1988) had a large impact and it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd many other
applications of subgame perfect implementation in the literature. For instance, Miyagawa
(2002) shows that while many axiomatic bargaining solutions are not monotonic, they can
be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium by a four-stage sequential mechanism.
Miyagawa’s (2002) mechanism to implement bargaining solutions cannot also escape from
our robustness argument.
There is a related paper by Aghion, Fudenberg, and Holden (henceforth, AFH) (2009).
They also consider the question of subgame perfect implementation with almost complete
information. AFH (2009) focus on a special class of mechanisms (henceforth, the Moore-
Repullo mechanism) in the spirit of the one deﬁned in Section 5 of Moore and Repullo
(1988).3 Under the assumption of complete information, given any social choice rule,
3In Section 4.1 of their paper, AFH (2009) go beyond the Moore-Repullo mechanism and obtain the
same conclusion in mechanisms satisfying the following properties:(1) there are three stages; (2) there are
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the Moore-Repullo mechanism guarantees that telling the truth is the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. In the same Moore-Repullo mechanism, however, AFH (2009) exhibit
some social choice rules where telling the truth is not an (sequential) equilibrium when
introducing a small amount of incomplete information. Loosely speaking, AFH (2009)
stress the failure of the lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence in the
limit of complete information. On the contrary, our paper shows that the introduction of
a small amount of incomplete information may induce new “bad” equilibria, i.e. equilibria
that do not implement. This corresponds to the failure of the upper hemi-continuity of
the equilibrium correspondence in the limit of complete information. When considering
implementation problems, we believe that this is a meaningful requirement that indeed
follows previous approaches (see Chung and Ely (2003)). While the motivation in AFH
(2009) is similar to the present paper in spirit, our “robustness tests” are diﬀerent and
the results are also very diﬀerent: (1) Our result is mechanism-free: we do not consider
a ﬁxed mechanism but a very general class of mechanisms that contains the one studied
by AFH (2009); (2) our non-robustness result applies to any social choice rule that is
not monotonic, while AFH (2009) focus on some social choice functions that fails their
robustness test. Thus, we are able to relate the non-robust feature of any subgame perfect
implementing mechanism to non-monotonicity of social choice rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the preliminary
notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 deﬁnes robust subgame perfect implementation. In
Section 4, we state the main theorem and illustrate the main idea of this paper through
an example. Section 5 concludes and illustrates the implications of our result for the
incomplete contract literature through a hold-up problem. Finally, the proof of our main
theorem is provided in the Appendix.
2 Setting
There is a ﬁnite set N = {1, ..., n} of players, and a set A of social alternatives, or outcomes.
There is a ﬁnite set Θ of states of nature. Associated with each state θ is a preference proﬁle
θ which is a list (θ1, ...,θn). Players do not observe the state directly, but are informed of
the state via signals. Player i’s signal set is Si which, for simplicity, we identify with Θ. A
two equally likely states of nature; (3) only one agent moves at each stage; and (4) pure strategies are only
considered.
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signal proﬁle is an element s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S ≡ ×i∈NSi. When the realized signal proﬁle
is s, each player i observes only his own signal si. We let μ denote the prior probability over
Θ×S, and let P be the set of all such priors. We note μ(· | si) for the probability measure
over Θ × S conditional on si. Let sθ be the signal proﬁle in which each player’s signal is
sθi . Complete information refers to the environments in which μ(θ, s) = 0 whenever s = sθ
(μ will be then referred to as a complete information prior). Under complete information,
the state, and hence the full proﬁle of preferences is always common knowledge among
agents. We will assume for each i and θ : μ(sθi ) ≡ [margSiμ](sθi ) > 0 so that Bayes rule is
well-deﬁned. Given a prior μ over Θ×S, we will sometimes abuse notations and write μ(θ)
for [margΘμ](θ). Besides, given s−i ∈ S−i, we will also write μ(s−i) as [margS−iμ](s−i).
Finally, given some arbitrary countable space X, δx will denote the probability measure
that puts probability 1 on {x} ⊂ X.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a mapping F which associates a subset of A
with each θ ∈ Θ. A single-valued social choice correspondence is a social choice function
(SCF) denoted f . Hence, any selection of SCC F is a social choice function. A mechanism
is an extensive game form Γ = (H,M, g) whereH is a set of histories h. M = M1×· · ·×Mn
and Mi = ×h∈HMi(h) for all i. An element of M(h) = M1(h)× · · · ×Mn(h), say m(h) =
(m1(h), ...,mn(h)) is a message proﬁle at h while mi(h) is i’s message at h. If #Mi(h) > 1
and #Mj(h) > 1 then agents i and j move simultaneously after history h, whereas if
#Mi(h) > 1 and #Mj(h) = 1 for all j = i then agent i is the only one to move. Histories
and messages are tied together by the property that M(h) = {m : (h,m) ∈ H}. An
element of Mi is a pure strategy; and an element of M is a pure strategy proﬁle. We
sometimes write m |h= (m1 |h, ...,mn |h) for the proﬁle of pure strategies starting from
history h.
There is an initial history ∅ ∈ H, and each history ht is represented by a sequence
with ﬁnite length t : (∅,m1,m2, ...,mt−1) = ht where for each k : mk ∈ M(hk).4 If for
t′ ≥ t+1 : ht′ = (ht,mt, ...,mt′−1), then ht′ follows history ht. As Γ contains ﬁnitely many
stages, there is a set of terminal histories5 HT ⊂ H such that HT = {h ∈ H :there is no h′
following h}. Given any strategy proﬁle m and any history h, there is a unique terminal
4As Moore and Repullo (1988), we restrict ourselves to mechanisms with ﬁnitely many stages. We
allow agents to move simultaneously at some nodes, so mechanisms need not be with perfect information.
However, at each node, all agents are assumed to know the entire history of the play.
5Note that M(h) = {m : (h,m) ∈ H} = ∅ for any h ∈ HT .
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history denoted hT [m,h]. Formally, let Z : M ×H → H be the mapping where
Z[m,h] =
{
(h,m(h)) if h /∈ HT
h otherwise
is the history that immediately follows h whenever possible given that strategy proﬁle m
has been played; and so hT [m,h] = limk→∞Zk[m,h] where Zk[m,h] = Z[m,Zk−1[m,h]].
Finally, the outcome function g : HT → A speciﬁes an outcome for each terminal history.
We will also note g(m;h) for the outcome that obtains when agents use strategy proﬁle
m starting from history h i.e. g(m;h) = g(hT [m,h]).
Assumption 1 Mi(h) is countable for each i and h.
Remark: This assumption is useful when using sequential equilibrium and avoids
technical complications due to the use of measures over uncountable spaces. We, however,
do not believe that our results critically depend on the countability assumption. We refer
the reader to Duggan (1997) for the treatment of general (uncountable) message spaces.
In addition, in our setting where the set of states has been assumed to be ﬁnite, the famous
mechanism by Moore and Repullo (1988, Section 5) uses only a ﬁnite set of messages.
A stage mechanism Γ together with a proﬁle θ ∈ Θ deﬁnes an extensive game Γ(θ).
A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for the game Γ(θ) is an element m∗ ∈ M such that,
for each agent i, g(m∗; ∅) θi g((mi,m∗−i); ∅) for all mi ∈ Mi. A (pure strategy) subgame
perfect equilibrium for the game Γ(θ) is an element m∗ ∈ M such that, for each agent i,
g(m∗;h) θi g((mi,m∗−i);h) for all mi ∈ Mi and all h ∈ H\HT . Let SPE(Γ(θ)) denote
the set of subgame perfect equilibria of the game Γ(θ). Let also NE(Γ(θ)) denote the set
of Nash equilibria of the game Γ(θ).
Given a prior μ, the mechanism determines a Bayesian game Γ(μ) in which each
player’s type is his signal, and after observing his signal, player i selects a (pure) strategy
from the set Mi. A strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1, ..., σn) lists a strategy for each player i
where σi : Si → Mi and σi(ht, si) is the message in Mi(ht) given history ht and signal
si. Alternatively, we will sometimes let σi be a (mixed) behavior strategy i.e. a function
that maps the set of possible histories and signals into the set of probability distributions
over messages: σi(· | ht, si) ∈ Δ(Mi(ht)) is the probability distribution over Mi(ht) given
history ht and signal si.
6
An act is a mapping α : Θ×S → A. Let A be the set of acts. A belief is a probability β
on Θ×S. In order to analyze incomplete information games, we must extend the original
preferences to the ones under uncertainty. We assume that for each belief β each player
i has a preference relation βi over acts. We make the following assumption (which is
obviously satisﬁed by expected utility models but much weaker than that) on this order:
Assumption 2 Let α and αˆ be two acts, and β a belief. Then
[α(θ, s) θi αˆ(θ, s) for all (θ, s) ∈ supp(β)]⇒ α βi αˆ,
where supp(β) denotes the support of β.
Let σ be a pure strategy proﬁle. Given a proﬁle of pure strategies σ = (σ1, ..., σn), we
will note g(σ;h) for the act that obtains when each agent i uses strategy σi starting after
history h occurred, i.e. each pair (θ, s) is mapped to g(σ(s);h) ∈ A. The act αΓσ induced
by σ under the mechanism Γ is deﬁned by αΓσ(θ, s) = g(σ(s); ∅) for any (θ, s).
We will also assume that in the game induced by a stage mechanism, for each player
best replies are always well-deﬁned in the neighborhood of complete information when
the opponents are playing according to some Nash equilibrium. In general, best-responses
need not be well-deﬁned since we allow Mi(h) to be countably inﬁnite. For instance,
integer games are such an example with countably inﬁnite message spaces in which best
replies need not be well deﬁned.6 The next assumption ensures that in the neighborhood
of complete information, against any Nash equilibrium strategy of his opponents, each
player i has a strategy that is optimal at histories in some given set H and equal to some
ﬁxed strategy at every other histories.
Assumption 3 A sequential mechanism Γ has well-deﬁned best replies: for any player
i, any set of histories H ⊆ H, any θ ∈ Θ, any (mi,m−i) ∈ NE(Γ(θ)), there ex-
ists ξ¯(i,H, θ,mi,m−i) > 0 such that for any β ∈ Δ(Θ × S−i) with β(θ, sθ−i) ≥ 1 −
ξ¯(i,H, θ,mi,m−i), there exists σ∗i [i,H, θ,mi,m−i, β], or simply σ
∗
i , satisfying
h /∈ H ⇒ σ∗i (h; sθi ) = mi(h);
h ∈ H ⇒ g((σ∗i , σ−i);h) βi g((σ′i, σ−i);h)
6If there is some player for whom there is no maximum with respect to his preference order at some
state of nature, then best-replies are indeed not well-deﬁned at this state in standard integer games.
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for any σ
′
i that diﬀers from σ
∗
i only at h and any σ−i such that σ−i(s−i) = m−i for any
s−i with β(s−i) > 0.
Remark: Note that Assumption 3 jointly restricts preference orders under uncertainty
and the class of mechanisms to be considered. Provided that order of preferences are
complete and transitive, Assumption 3 is vacuously satisﬁed in ﬁnite mechanisms, as for
instance, the simple mechanism in Section 5 of Moore and Repullo (1988) that uses a
ﬁnite set of messages. 7 If the mechanism is not ﬁnite but the set of outcomes is, again
Assumption 3 is vacuously satisﬁed. Finally, we note that Assumption 3 is not needed
in sequential mechanisms in which each agent moves only once. 8 Moore (1992) deﬁnes
a simple sequential mechanism as a mechanism where each agent moves only once and
moreover, only one agent moves at each stage. Although these simple mechanisms are
considered to possess an even stronger justiﬁcation for the use of subgame perfection,
they are not robust to incomplete information in our sense.
When we perturb a complete information situation introducing a slight incomplete
information, we must specify the equilibrium concept we use. In this paper we will focus
on sequential equilibrium. Since our result provides necessary conditions, it will hold for
any coarser equilibrium concept as for instance perfect Bayesian equilibrium, subgame
perfect equilibrium. We now recall the deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium as deﬁned in
Kreps and Wilson (1982).
Sequential Equilibrium:
A system of beliefs of agent i is deﬁned as a function φi : Si ×H → Δ(Θ× S−i). Let
φi[(θ, s−i) | si, ht] denote agent i’s belief that the state (θ, si, s−i) is realized when agent
i’s signal is si and the observed history is ht. We will henceforth abuse notations and
sometimes consider φi[(θ, s−i) | si, ht] as an element of Δ(Θ× S). We also say a vector of
beliefs φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) is Bayes consistent with a strategy proﬁle σ if beliefs are updated
from one stage to the next using Bayes’ rule whenever possible (see Fudenberg and Tirole
7Recall that we have assumed that the set of state of nature is ﬁnite.
8One can directly check this in the deﬁnition of strategy σ (Σ2) used in the proof of Theorem 1. More
speciﬁcally, it can be checked there that for each player, Assumption 3 is only used at histories where
this player has to choose a message and at which he has previously deviated from the equilibrium. By
deﬁnition, in a simple sequential mechanism, there is no such history.
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(1991) for its precise deﬁnition). An assessment is a pair (φ, σ) consisting of a proﬁle of
beliefs and a pure behavior strategy proﬁle.
Definition 1 A sequential equilibrium is an assessment (φ, σ) that satisﬁes condition (S)
and (C):
(S) Sequential rationality: for all i ∈ N, si ∈ Si, ht ∈ H :
g(σ, ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i), ht)
for each σ′i.
(C) Consistency: there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy proﬁles (σk1 , ..., σ
k
n)
converging to (σ1, ..., σn) with Bayes consistent beliefs φk converging to φ. 9
For our main theorem, we need one more assumption.
Assumption 4 (One-Shot Deviation Principle) A sequential mechanism Γ satisﬁes
the one-shot deviation principle if, for every i ∈ N, si ∈ Si, ht ∈ H and consistent
assessment (φ, σ): whenever
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for every σ′i that diﬀers from σi only at ht (local sequential rationality), it follows that
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for every σ′i (sequential rationality).
Remark: Assumption 4 also jointly restricts the class of mechanisms considered as
well as preference orders under uncertainty. Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996) indeed
show that the one-shot deviation principle holds for sequential equilibria in ﬁnite stage
games as long as agents are expected utility maximizers.10 However, this paper uses
9Convergence in the deﬁnition of consistency is taken uniformly over messages and histories. Given
that the set of messages (and so the set of histories) can be countably inﬁnite, two natural convergence
notions can be used: point-wise convergence or uniform convergence. The set of sequential equilibria is
smaller when one assumes uniform convergence. Hence, the use of uniform convergence strengthens our
main result.
10Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996) assume that for each i and h, Mi(h) is ﬁnite. It is easy to check
that their argument goes through in case Mi(h) is countably inﬁnite.
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a class of preference orders under uncertainty that is weaker than the expected utility
representation. In Appendix B, we provide very weak conditions on preference orders
under uncertainty so that the one-shot deviation principle holds. Note also that the one-
shot deviation principle trivially holds in mechanisms where each agent moves only once.
3 SPE-implementation
Henceforth, we assume that A is an arbitrary topological space, and that A = AΘ×S
is endowed with the product topology. Given a mechanism Γ, we denote the sequential
equilibrium correspondence by ψSEΓ : P → A where each element α of ψSEΓ (μ) is an act cor-
responding to some sequential equilibrium outcome of Γ(μ), which describes the alternative
α(θ, s) that will result for each (θ, s) (where SE stands for sequential equilibrium). For-
mally, ψSEΓ (μ) ≡
{
α ∈ A : α = αΓσ where (φ, σ) is a sequential equilibrium for some φ
}
.
Let
graph ψSEΓ ≡ {(μ,α) : α ∈ ψSEΓ (μ)}.
The following notation will be convenient. If B is a set of acts such that for any selection
f of F , there is α ∈ B for which α(θ, s) = f(θ) for any (θ, s) ∈ supp(μ), then we will
write B μ F . Further, if B is a set of acts such that α(θ, s) ∈ F(θ) for each α ∈ B and
any (θ, s) ∈ supp(μ), then we will write B μ F . If B μ F and B μ F , then we write
B =μ F .
Definition 2 A stage mechanism Γ SE-implements an SCC F : Θ → A under μ if
ψSEΓ (μ) =μ F .
When μ is a complete information prior, the above deﬁnition is equivalent to the stan-
dard deﬁnition of subgame perfect implementation. The next lemma is its formalization.
We provide it with no proof.
Lemma 1 Let μ be a complete information prior. A stage mechanism Γ SE-implements
an SCC F : Θ → A under μ if and only if for each (θ, sθ) ∈ Θ × S with μ(θ, sθ) > 0, we
have g(SPE(Γ(θ)); ∅) = F(θ),
As in Chung and Ely (2003), we consider the “closure” of the solution correspondence
ψSEΓ . Deﬁne
ψSEΓ (μ) = {α : (μ,α) ∈ graph ψSEΓ }.
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Recall that (μ,α) ∈ graph ψSEΓ if there exists a sequence {(μk, αk)}∞k=1 such that (i)
(μk, αk) ∈ graph ψSEΓ for each k and (ii) (μk, αk)→ (μ,α). The following is our deﬁnition
of robust implementation, denoted SPE-implementation.
Definition 3 A mechanism Γ SE-implements an SCC F : Θ→ A under μ if ψSEΓ (μ) =μ
F . When μ is a complete information prior, we say that Γ SPE-implements F under μ.
Finally we say that an SCC F : Θ→ A is SPE-implementable under complete information
if there exists a mechanism Γ that SE-implements F under any complete information prior
μ.
The notion we deﬁned above for sequential equilibria can be deﬁned for any solution
concept (as done for instance in Chung and Ely (2003)). Hence, given an arbitrary solution
concept E , we will sometimes say that an SCC is E-implementable.
4 Monotonicity as a Necessary Condition
In this section, we state our main theorem and illustrate the main idea of its proof via an
example. We relegate the proof of the theorem to Appendix A.
4.1 Theorem and Illustration
We now recall the deﬁnition of monotonicity as deﬁned in Maskin (1999).
Definition 4 An SCC F is said to be monotonic if, for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and any a ∈ F(θ),
(∗) ∀i ∈ N,∀b ∈ A, a θi b =⇒ a θ
′
i b,
we have a ∈ F(θ′).
We are now in a position to state our main theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are satisﬁed. If an SCC is SPE-
implementable under complete information, it is necessarily monotonic.
Remark: This result seems to contradict Proposition 2 of Kreps and Wilson (1982),
which shows that the sequential equilibrium correspondence is upper hemi-continuous.
This apparent inconsistency comes from the very fact that the sequential equilibrium
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correspondence is upper hemi-continuous provided that μ has full support over Θ× S (as
is assumed in Kreps and Wilson (1982)). However – as shown in our illustration – when
μ assigns probability 0 to some proﬁle (θ, s), upper hemi-continuity may not hold.
The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to Appendix A. Here, we rather illustrate the
main idea of the proof through the simple mechanism proposed in Section 5 of Moore and
Repullo (1988). The set of payoﬀ states is {θ, θ′}. There are two agents, called 1 and 2.
For each i = 1, 2, agent i’s complete and transitive preference relation in state θ˜ ∈ {θ, θ′}
is given by θ˜i . The agents commonly observe the state, but the planer does not observe
it.
We extend the set of outcomes A to A˜ ≡ A × R2. An element of A˜ is now a tuple
(a, t1, t2) where a is an outcome while for each player i : ti denotes the transfer to player
i. For any θ˜ ∈ {θ, θ′}, preferences over A are extended to (complete and transitive)
preferences over A˜ denoted by θ˜i . We assume that transfers to player −i do not aﬀect
player i’s ordering, hence, throughout this example, when considering i’s evaluations over
outcomes, we ignore agent j(= i)’s monetary transfer from the expression, i.e. we will
abuse notations and for instance, simply note (a, ti) instead of (a, ti, tj). We will further
assume that for any θ˜ ∈ {θ, θ′}, a θ˜i b implies (a, ti)
θ˜i (b, ti) for any ti. To ﬁx ideas, one
instance of this extension is the setting with transfers and quasilinear preferences.
We assume that f(θ) = f(θ′) and f : Θ → A˜ is “non-monotonic” and therefore not
Nash implementable. With this, we must satisfy the following condition:
∀i,∀b ∈ A˜ : f(θ)θi b ⇒ f(θ)θ
′
i b (∗∗)
Following Section 5 of Moore and Repullo (1988), we argue that this non-monotonic f
can be implemented as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the following
3-stage mechanism, under some assumptions (speciﬁed further) that are naturally satisﬁed
in a setting with (large) transfers and quasi-linear preferences.
Stage 1: Agent 1 announces the state θ (resp., θ′). Then, the game moves to Stage 2.
Stage 2: If agent 2 agrees (i.e. announces the same state as agent 1), then the game
ends here and f(θ) (resp., f(θ′)) is chosen. If agent 2 challenges by announcing θ′ (resp.,
θ), the game moves to Stage 3.
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Stage 3: Conditioning on agent 1’s announcement θ (resp., θ′) at Stage 1, agent 1 has
to choose between x(θ) (resp., x(θ′)) and y(θ) (resp., y(θ′)) such that
x(θ) θ1 y(θ), and
(resp., x(θ′) θ′1 y(θ′), and)
y(θ) θ′1 x(θ).
(resp., y(θ′) θ1 x(θ′).)
Further, if agent 1 chooses x(θ) (resp., x(θ′)), then agent 1 receives (x(θ),−Δ) (resp.,
(x(θ′),−Δ)); agent 2 receives (x(θ),−Δ) (resp., (x(θ),−Δ)); and the planner nets 2Δ –
whereas if agent 1 chooses y(θ) (resp., y(θ′)), then agent 1 receives (y(θ),−Δ) (resp.,
(y(θ′),−Δ)); agent 2 receives (y(θ),+Δ) (resp., (y(θ′),+Δ)); and the planner breaks
even. 11 The game stops here. It is assumed that Δ is “large enough” i.e., Δ satisﬁes
(f(θ′), 0)θ′1 (y(θ),−Δ); (y(θ),+Δ)θ
′
2 (f(θ), 0); and (f(θ
′), 0)θ′2 (x(θ′),−Δ). Similarly,
(f(θ), 0)θ1(y(θ′),−Δ); (y(θ′),+Δ)θ2(f(θ′), 0); and (f(θ), 0)θ2(x(θ),−Δ). Note that by
transitivity, this implies in particular that (f(θ′), 0)θ′1 (x(θ),−Δ) and
(f(θ), 0)θ1(x(θ′),−Δ).
The key property of this mechanism is that whatever the state is, there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium where agent 1 tells the truth and agent 2 does not challenge.
In addition, if agent 1 lies announcing θ˜, then agent 2 challenges and at stage 3 agent 1
chooses y(θ˜) while if he tells the truth, he chooses x(θ˜). This can be formally described
as follows.
Denote by m∗i (θ˜;h) agent i’s strategy in state θ˜ ∈ {θ, θ′} at history h.
• m∗1(θ; ∅) = θ and m∗1(θ′; ∅) = θ′;
• m∗2(θ; θ) = θ;m∗2(θ′; θ′) = θ′,m∗2(θ; θ′) = θ; and m∗2(θ′; θ) = θ′; and
• m∗1(θ; (θ, θ′)) = x(θ);m∗1(θ; (θ′, θ)) = y(θ′);m∗1(θ′; (θ′, θ)) = x(θ′); and m∗1(θ′; (θ, θ′)) =
y(θ).
To see that m∗ constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. First, note that
m∗ prescribes the outcome where agent 1 will announce the true state and agent 2 will
11The existence of such x(·) and y(·) is guaranteed by the following weak domain restriction: there are
a, b ∈ A and an agent i for whom a θi b and b θ
′
i a (preference reversal).
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not challenge. Suppose that agent 1 announces the state θ (resp., θ′). If agent 1 lies, then
agent 2 can challenge her with the truth, and at stage 3, agent 1 will choose y(θ) (resp.,
y(θ′)). This is so by construction. Given the choice of Δ, this must be worse for agent 1
than what the social choice function f oﬀers if agent 1 tells the truth. Equally, given the
deﬁnition of Δ, agent 2 will be satisﬁed with his reward of Δ. On the other hand, if agent
1 tells the truth, then agent 2 will not (falsely) challenge, since agent 1 would now choose
x(θ) (resp., x(θ′)) at Stage 3, which incurs a penalty of Δ for agent 2.
Hence, the above mechanism implements the SCF f in subgame perfect equilibria.
By Maskin (1999), it is not implemented in Nash equilibria since f is non-monotonic.
Thus, there is a Nash equilibrium outcome that does not yield the right outcome. We
will show that the introduction of an arbitrarily small incomplete information (together
with the failure of monotonicity) makes this “bad” Nash equilibrium outcome a sequential
equilibrium outcome.
The complete information setting described above is seen as an incomplete information
situation where agents have a common prior such that μ(θ, sθ1, s
θ
2) = p and μ(θ
′, sθ′1 , s
θ′
2 ) =
1− p, where 0 < p < 1. Now let us introduce the following perturbation of the complete
information structure νε.12
νε sθ1, s
θ
2 s
θ
1, s
θ′
2 s
θ′
1 , s
θ
2 s
θ′
1 , s
θ′
2
θ p(1− ε) pε/2 pε/2 0
θ′ 0 0 0 1− p
Observe that νε → μ as ε → 0. In the following lines, we show that the failure
of monotonicity allows us to turn the “bad” Nash equilibrium outcome into a “bad”
sequential equilibrium outcome. We propose the following strategy proﬁle σ∗ of the game
Γ(νε) under which agent 1 claims that the true state is θ independently of his signal and
player 2 never challenges player 1. More precisely, the description of the strategy is given
by:
• σ∗1(sθ1, ∅) = σ∗1(sθ
′
1 , ∅) = θ;
• σ∗2(s2, θ˜) = θ for any θ˜ ∈ {θ, θ′} and any s2 ∈ {sθ2, sθ
′
2 }; and
• σ∗1(sθ1, (θ, θ′)) = x(θ);σ∗1(sθ
′
1 , (θ, θ
′)) = x(θ);σ∗1(s
θ
1, (θ
′, θ)) = y(θ′); and σ∗1(s
θ′
1 , (θ
′, θ)) =
x(θ′).
12The common prior assumption is completely dispensable for the rest of arguments.
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Note that, αΓσ∗ , the act induced by σ
∗, is such that αΓσ∗(θ′, sθ
′
1 , s
θ′
2 ) = f(θ). Hence, if
each player i receives a signal sθ
′
i and plays according to σ
∗
i , the outcome provided is f(θ).
Indeed, this σ∗ constitutes a (bad) Nash equilibrium.
Now we turn to the description of beliefs of players. The fundamental property we
need is that when agent i has the opportunity to move after a history that is not consistent
with his opponent choosing an equilibrium strategy, then this agent will assign probability
one to (θ, sθ−i). This proposed system of beliefs will turn out to be perfectly consistent as
explained further. Let us be more formal. For each player i, his belief φ∗i is deﬁned as
follows:
• φ∗i [·|si, ∅] = νε(·|si) for each i = 1, 2 and each si ∈ {sθi , sθ
′
i };
• φ∗2[·|s2, θ] = νε(·|s2) for each s2 ∈ {sθ2, sθ
′
2 }; and φ∗2[·|s2, θ′] = δ(θ,sθ1) for each s2 ∈
{sθ2, sθ
′
2 };
• φ∗1
[·∣∣s1, (θ, θ′)] = δ(θ,sθ2) for each s1 ∈ {sθ1, sθ′1 }; and φ∗1[·|s1, (θ′, θ)] = νε(·|s1) for any
s1 ∈ {sθ1, sθ
′
1 }.
What we want to show is that the proposed assessment (φ∗, σ∗) constitutes a se-
quential equilibrium of the game Γ(νε) for any ε > 0 small enough. In this case, since
αΓσ∗(θ
′, sθ′1 , sθ
′
2 ) = f(θ) and ν
ε(θ′, sθ′1 , sθ
′
2 ) = 1 − p > 0, this shows that with probability
1−p, a bad outcome is provided (i.e. f(θ) instead of f(θ′)); this is indeed enough to show
that the mechanism provided in this section does not SPE-implements f .
First, we will check sequential rationality of (φ∗, σ∗). At h3 = (θ, θ′), agent 1 has to
choose between x(θ) and y(θ). Due to the construction of φ∗1, regardless of the signal
received, agent 1 believes with probability one that the state is θ. Then, by Assumption 2
and13 by construction of x(θ) and y(θ), it is optimal for her to choose x(θ). Let h3 = (θ′, θ).
Suppose agent 1 received sθ1. In this case, by construction of φ
∗
1 and ν
ε(·|sθ1), agent 1 knows
that the state is θ. Here, agent 1 has to choose between x(θ′) and y(θ′). By construction
(and Assumption 2), it is optimal for her to choose y(θ′), regardless of ε. Suppose that
agent 1 received sθ
′
1 . Due to the construction of φ
∗
1 and small enough ε > 0, agent 1 believes
13Assumption 2 ensures that preferences in this degenerate incomplete information case (where player i
believes with probability one that the state is θ) are the same as under complete information, namely as
 
θ
i .
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with high probability that the state is θ′. With an additional assumption of continuity of
preferences, we proceed to argue that it is optimal for her to choose x(θ′). 14
With this in mind, we move to Stage 2. Suppose that h2 = θ. In this case, if agent 2
chooses θ′, he knows that agent 1 will choose x(θ). Assume that agent 2 received sθ2. In
this case, by construction of φ∗2 and νε(·|sθ2), agent 2 knows that the state is θ. But since
(f(θ), 0)θ2(x(θ),−Δ), by Assumption 2, we can conclude that it is optimal for agent 2 to
choose θ.
Assume that agent 2 received sθ
′
2 . As we argued before, agent 2 knows that agent 1 will
choose x(θ). We also know that (f(θ), 0)θ2(x(θ),−Δ). By condition (∗∗), we can obtain
that (f(θ), 0)θ′2 (x(θ),−Δ) as well. Since νε(·|sθ
′
2 ) assigns strictly positive weights only to
(θ, sθ1, s
θ′
2 ) and (θ
′, sθ′1 , s
θ′
2 ), by Assumption 2, we can conclude that it is again optimal for
agent 2 to choose θ.
Suppose that h2 = θ′. In this case, due to the construction of φ∗2, agent 2 believes
with probability one that the state is θ and that agent 1 will choose y(θ′) at Stage 3. But
we know that (y(θ′),+Δ)θ2(f(θ′), 0). By Assumption 2, we can conclude that for any
s2 ∈ {sθ2, sθ
′
2 }, it is optimal for agent 2 to choose θ.
Finally, we move to Stage 1. If agent 1 chooses θ, she knows that agent 2 will choose
θ so that f(θ) is chosen. On the other hand, suppose agent 1 chooses θ′. Assume also
that she received sθ1. Then, she knows that the state is θ and that agent 2 will choose
θ at Stage 2 and she herself will choose either x(θ′) or y(θ′) at Stage 3. We know that
(f(θ), 0)θ1(x(θ′),−Δ) and (f(θ), 0)θ1(y(θ′),−Δ), hence, (by Assumption 2) we can con-
clude that it is optimal for her to choose θ.
Assume, on the contrary, that agent 1 received sθ
′
1 . If agent 1 deviates to θ
′, she knows
that agent 2 will choose θ at Stage 2 and she herself will choose either x(θ′) or y(θ′)
at Stage 3. As we argued above, we have chosen Δ > 0 so that (f(θ), 0)θ1(x(θ′),−Δ)
and (f(θ), 0)θ1(y(θ′),−Δ). By condition (∗∗), we also obtain (f(θ), 0)θ
′
1 (x(θ
′),−Δ) and
(f(θ), 0)θ′1 (y(θ′),−Δ). Since φ∗1[·|sθ
′
1 , ∅] assigns strictly positive weights only to (θ, sθ
′
1 , s
θ
2)
and (θ′, sθ′1 , sθ
′
2 ), by Assumption 2, we can conclude that it is optimal for agent 1 to choose
θ at Stage 1.
14As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the same argument can go through even if (perhaps due to the
lack of continuity of preferences) y(θ′) is a best reply. In general, what really matters here is the existence
of a best response for agent 1, and this is where Assumption 3 plays a role. We checked, by means of an
example, that our construction of the “bad” sequential equilibrium in the proof of Theorem 1 fails when
Assumption 3 is dropped; the example is available upon request.
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We conclude that (φ∗, σ∗) so constructed satisﬁes sequential rationality.
Next we will check consistency of (φ∗, σ∗). Roughly, given that agent 1 pools at stage 1
(i.e. agent 1 plays θ independently of his signal), if agent 2 receives an opportunity to move
when agent 1 has deviated from the equilibrium path, his beliefs induced by sequences of
mixed strategies converging to σ∗ are going to depend on the likelihood ratio of making
“mistakes” (i.e. of playing θ′ for agent 1 at stage 1) for one signal over another. For
instance, in case it is inﬁnitely more likely that agent 1 makes a mistake when receiving
signal sθ1 rather than when she receives s
θ′
1 , then, when agent 2 has an opportunity to
move after agent 1 has deviated from the equilibrium path, he will (Bayes-consistently)
believe with probability one that agent 1 has received signal sθ1 and so by construction that
the true state must be θ. Since agent 2 also pools at stage 2, a similar argument applies
for agent 1’s beliefs at stage 3. Hence, many diﬀerent oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are
going to satisfy consistency, and in particular the one we built above. In general, this
shows that a small amount of incomplete information may induce large changes on the set
of consistent beliefs.
We now move to the more technical part and construct the appropriate sequence of
completely mixed strategies. Let {ηk}∞k=1 be a sequence such that ηk > 0 for each k and
ηk → 0 as k → ∞. Let a sequence of totally mixed strategy proﬁles {σk}∞k=1 be deﬁned
as follows:
σk1(θ | ∅, sθ1) = 1− ηk
σk1(θ | ∅, sθ
′
1 ) = 1− η2k
σk2 (θ | θ, sθ2) = σk2(θ | θ′, sθ2) = 1− ηk
σk2 (θ | θ, sθ
′
2 ) = σ
k
2(θ | θ′, sθ
′
2 ) = 1− η2k
and
σk1 (x(θ) | (θ, θ′), sθ1) = 1− ηk
σk1 (y(θ
′) | (θ′, θ), sθ1) = 1− ηk
σk1 (x(θ) | (θ, θ′), sθ
′
1 ) (resp., σ
k
1 (x(θ
′) | (θ′, θ), sθ′1 ) = 1− η2k
Note that σk → σ∗ by construction. We can deﬁne the Bayes consistent belief proﬁle
φk associated with σk. We claim that φk → φ∗ as k → ∞. For simplicity, we only pay
attention to checking beliefs of each player i after histories in which i’s opponent did not
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play according to his equilibrium strategies. This can be done by explicitly computing the
following:
φk1 [(θ, s
θ
2)|sθ1, (θ, θ′)]
=
νε(θ, sθ1, s
θ
2)× σk1(θ | ∅, sθ1)× σk2 (θ′ | θ, sθ2)
νε(θ, sθ1, s
θ
2)× σk1 (θ | ∅, sθ1)× σk2 (θ′ | θ, sθ2) + νε(θ, sθ1, sθ′2 )× σk1 (θ | ∅, sθ1)× σk2 (θ′ | θ, sθ′2 )
=
p(1− ε)(1− ηk)ηk
p(1− ε)(1− ηk)ηk + (pε/2)(1− ηk)η2k
=
p(1− ε)
p(1− ε) + pεηk/2 → 1 (as k →∞)
φk1 [(θ, s
θ
2)|sθ
′
1 , (θ, θ
′)] =
(pε/2)(1− η2k)(ηk)
(pε/2)(1− η2k)(ηk) + (1− p)(1− η2k)η2k
=
pε/2
pε/2 + (1− p)ηk → 1 (as k →∞)
φk2 [(θ, s
θ
1)|sθ2, θ′] =
p(1− ε)ηk
p(1− ε)ηk + (pε/2)η2k
=
p(1− ε)
p(1− ε) + pεηk/2 → 1 (as k →∞)
φk2 [(θ, s
θ
1)|sθ
′
2 , θ
′] =
(pε/2)ηk
(pε/2)ηk + (1− p)η2k
=
pε/2
pε/2 + (1− p)ηk → 1 (as k →∞)
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we prove a necessary condition result focusing on subgame perfect imple-
mentation which is similar to the one found by Chung and Ely (2003) for undominated
Nash implementation. It is natural to check what strengthening of Maskin’s monotonic-
ity would ensure SPE-implementation. Given that we will have to assume monotonicity,
there is probably very little gain to build a sequential mechanism, a static one would most
likely be enough. Chung and Ely (2003) have provided a slight strengthening of Maskin’s
suﬃcient conditions for Nash implementability15 under which UNE-implementation is en-
sured (where UNE stands for undominated Nash equilibrium). Following their proof, it
is very easy to check that their suﬃcient conditions actually imply NE-implementation
which in the static case is equivalent to our notion of SPE-implementation.
To prove our main theorem, we restricted our attention to a class of mechanisms
where best-responses are well-deﬁned (Assumption 3). This assumption is useful in our
construction and allows us to build a sequential equilibrium that does not provide the
desired outcomes. There might be some possibility for non-monotonic SCCs to be SPE-
implementable using mechanisms where best-responses are not well-deﬁned. While this
15This suﬃcient condition is provided under a slight strengthening of the assumptions on preference
orders.
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is an interesting (open) theoretical question, such a robustness result would critically use
the fact that the mechanism is not well-behaved and so should not be taken too seriously.
As a ﬁnal remark, we investigate the relevance of our result to the hold-up problem,
through an example. 16 This is indeed the main theme of AFH (2009). Therefore, from
the outset, we shall clarify the diﬀerence between what we do and AFH (2009). In Section
5.2 of their paper, AFH (2009) show that the ﬁrst-best investment cannot be achieved
in the Moore-Repullo mechanism because they can take into account the fact that the
truth-telling cannot be an equilibrium in nearby games. On the other hand, we argue that
SPE implementation requires that an SCF be monotonic, and in particular, constant
in the example discussed below. Then, we can conclude that the ﬁrst-best investment
cannot be achieved because we have to consider only constant SCFs (non-contingent con-
tracts).17 Furthermore, we can also show that when SPE-implementation is considered,
the optimal contract must be non-contingent. Arguably, non-contingent contracts are in-
complete, which exhibits a stark contrast with very sophisticated contracts Maskin and
Tirole (1999a) proposed. Note that Maskin and Tirole’s (1999a) argument is based on the
standard subgame perfect implementation.
We come to the analysis. There are two parties, a buyer (B) and seller (S) of a single
unit of an indivisible good. If trade occurs, then B’s payoﬀ is VB = θ − p, where θ is the
value of the good and p is the price. S’s payoﬀ is VS = p. The good can be of either high
or low quality. If it is high quality, then B values the good at θ = θH = 14, and if it is
low quality, then θ = θL = 10.
The set of social alternatives in this economy can be deﬁned as
A =
{
(q, yB , yS) ∈ [0, 1] × R2| yB + yS = 0
}
,
where q denotes the probability that the good is transferred from S to B and yB(yS)
denotes the amount of money received by B(S). Agents are assumed to value (non-
deterministic) outcomes through expected utility.
16The example is adapted from AFH (2007) who acknowledge that their example is based on the one of
Hart and Moore (2003).
17Following Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988), AFH (2009) argue that the hold-up problem disap-
pears for some crazy type perturbations, which is much richer perturbations than this paper admits (See
also a brief discussion on this point in our introduction). On the other hand, they argue that the hold-up
problem remains for some common p-belief perturbations, which we use as the same class of perturbations.
The reader should be referred to AFH (2009) for the details.
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First, we claim that only constant SCFs are monotonic. Let an arbitrary SCF f∗ be
that f∗(θL) = (q∗, y∗B, y
∗
S) ∈ A. Let θ = θL and θ
′
= θH . Let b = (q, yB , yS) ∈ A.
f∗(θL) θLB b and f∗(θL) θLS b
=⇒ 10q∗ + y∗B ≥ 10q + yB and y∗S ≥ yS
=⇒ y∗B ≥ 10(q − q∗) + yB and y∗S ≥ yS
=⇒ −y∗S ≥ 10(q − q∗) + yB and y∗S ≥ yS because y∗B + y∗S = 0
=⇒ −yS ≥ 10(q − q∗) + yB and y∗S ≥ yS because y∗S ≥ yS iﬀ −yS ≥ −y∗S
=⇒ 0 ≥ 10(q − q∗) because yB + yS = 0
=⇒ q∗ ≥ q and 10q∗ + y∗B ≥ 10q + yB
=⇒ q∗ ≥ q and 14q∗ + y∗B ≥ 14q + yB
=⇒ f∗(θL) θHB b and f∗(θL) θHS b
This implies that (∗) in the deﬁnition of monotonicity holds between θL and θH . Then,
monotonicity requires that f∗(θL) = f∗(θH).
Second, we embed this example into the hold-up problem. Here, any implementing
mechanism is interpreted as a contract. In this example, any monotonic SCF corresponds
to a non-contingent contract. There are four dates in this contractual relationship: At date
1, the two parties sign a contract, i.e., propose a mechanism and agree on playing it later.
At date 2, S makes a “non-contractible” (relation-speciﬁc) investment. At date 3, the
parties receive the signals. At date 4, the parties play the mechanism which is proposed at
date 1. We shall enlarge on the investment stage of the model. After a contract is signed,
only S makes a non-contractible investment eS , which increases the probability that the
good entails high value.18 For simplicity, there are only two levels of investment: either
eS = 1 (investment) or eS = 0 (no investment). The cost of investment c(eS) is given as:
c(eS) = 1/3 if eS = 1 and c(eS) = 0 if eS = 0. It is common knowledge that the likelihood
18Here the seller’s investment entails direct externalities a` la Che and Hausch (1999). This externality
is important for the rest of the argument because if the buyer instead makes investment (i.e., selﬁsh
investment), there is no underinvestment in the hold-up problem, given the monotonic (and so constant)
SCF. Clearly, this is due to the property that, in the present setting, a monotonic SCF is constant; whether
this is a general property in hold-up problems is left as an open question.
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of the states of the world depend upon signal realizations at date 3 and S’s investment:
μ(θL, s
θL
B , s
θL
S |eS = 0) = μ(θH , sθHB , sθHS |eS = 0) = 1/2
μ(θL, s
θL
B , s
θL
S |eS = 1) = 1/3
μ(θH , s
θH
B , s
θH
S |eS = 1) = 2/3
Let a monotonic SCF f∗∗ be such that f∗∗(θL) = f∗∗(θH) = (1,−10, 10). Note that we
already have argued that only constant SCFs are monotonic. This f∗∗ is S’s best contract
that satisﬁes both ex post individual rationality and monotonicity.19 Our Theorem 1
shows that this SCF f∗∗ is S’s best contract among all ex post individually rational SCFs
that are SPE-implementable.20 It is rather trivial to realize that the SCF f∗∗ is easily
implementable in any equilibrium because it is a constant SCF and there is no need to
extract information from the agents. Given the SCF f∗∗, it is optimal for S to make
“no” investment. Thus, SPE-implementability makes the hold-up problem to involve
underinvestment. Che and Hausch (1999) obtain the same conclusion (their Proposition
2) in a more general setup. They assume that the parties cannot credibly commit not to
renegotiate the initial non-contingent contract. These contract terms can be renegotiated
to ex post eﬃcient quantity after the parties realize the state. Restricting attention to the
initial non-contingent contracts with ex post renegotiation, they show that when the degree
of cooperative nature of investments is suﬃciently high, any non-contingent contract has
no value, i.e., the same as no contract. Indeed, within this example, we show that there is
no loss of generality to restrict attention to non-contingent contracts if we require SPE-
implementation for the initial contract. This can be a support to the property rights
approach of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).21
19Ex post individual rationality guarantees that each player receives at least the utility of no trade at
each state of nature.
20To be exact, this is the case, provided that the implementing mechanism satisﬁes Assumption 3.
21One way to get positive results would be to weaken the requirement of “exact” implementation to
“virtual” implementation where non-deterministic mechanisms are used and we only require the SCR to
be implemented with high probability. By Abreu and Matsushima (1992), we know that we can virtually
implement almost any SCF using rationalizability as the solution concept. One can indeed show that
if a SCF is (virtually) R-implementable (i.e. using rationalizability as the solution concept) then, it is
also (virtually) R¯-implementable (see Kunimoto (2009) for details). While deﬁnitely of great theoretical
importance, on a practical viewpoint, the Abreu and Matsushima’s approach has several drawbacks. First,
mechanisms used there are demanding from the agents’ viewpoint. Indeed, Glazer and Rosenthal (1992)
argue that these mechanisms will not perform as predicted because it may involve many rounds of iterated
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
Let μ be a complete information prior such that μ(θ˜, sθ˜) > 0 for all θ˜ ∈ Θ, and let F be
a SPE-implementable SCC with implementing mechanism Γ. Fix any θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ and any
a ∈ F(θ). Suppose θ and θ′ are two possible states satisfying (∗) in Deﬁnition 4 (p.11).
We will show that a ∈ F(θ′).
Since Γ SPE-implements F , it must also SPE-implements F . Thus, by Lemma 1,
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium m∗θ in Γ(θ) such that g(m
∗
θ) = a. Clearly, m
∗
θ is
actually a Nash equilibrium of Γ(θ). From (∗), it follows that m∗θ is also a Nash equilibrium
of Γ(θ′). Recall that H denotes the set of all possible histories. For each t ≥ 0, let h∗t be
the history induced by m∗θ up to date t and denote H∗ for the set of all such histories. In
addition, for each player i, let H∗−i be the set of histories h along which every player j = i
has chosen the message m∗θ,j(h
′); formally, H∗−i ≡ {h ∈ H : h = (∅,m1,m2, ...,mt−1) for
some t and mt
′
j = m
∗,t′
j,θ for all t
′ ≤ t− 1 and all j = i}. Note that h∗t ∈ H∗−i for each t ≥ 1.
Consider the following family of information structure νε. For each player i, let τi
represent the proﬁle of signals s = (s1, ..., sn) deﬁned by si = sθ
′
i and sj = s
θ
j for all j = i.
For all i, νε describes
νε(θ, τi) =
ε
n
μ(θ, sθ);
νε(θ, sθ) = (1− ε)μ(θ, sθ); and
νε(θ˜, sθ˜) = μ(θ˜, sθ˜) ∀θ˜ = θ.
In this information structure when the state is anything other than θ or θ′, the state
is common knowledge. Furthermore, when a player observes θ, he knows that the state is
θ. Obviously, νε → μ as ε → 0. 22 The support of νε is denoted
supp(νε) = {(θ˜, sθ˜) : θ˜ ∈ Θ} ∪ {(θ, τi) : i ∈ N}.
dominance, suspecting that players may sometimes “abandon the logic of iterated dominance in favor of
a focal point in the game”. This intuition is indeed supported by experimental evidence; see Sefton and
Yavas (1996). Second, and more importantly, these mechanisms may provide ex post an outcome arbitrarily
ineﬃcient, unfair, or, more generally, far from the desired alternative. For these reasons, these mechanisms
have not been considered of great practical importance and, a fortiori, have not been considered as putting
into question the foundation of incomplete contracts.
22We use exactly the same information structures as in Chung and Ely (2003).
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Fix ε > 0 to be suﬃciently small so that νε((θ′, sθ′−i) | sθ
′
i ) ≥ 1−ξ¯(i,H∗−i\H∗, θ′,m∗i,θ,m∗−i,θ)
where ξ¯(i,H∗−i\H∗, θ′,m∗i,θm∗−i,θ) is in Assumption 3.
We build a sequential equilibrium (φ, σ) of Γ(νε) where σ induces an act αΓσ for which
αΓσ(θ′, sθ
′
) = a. Hence, this will show that (νε, αΓσ) ∈ graph ψSEΓ for all ε > 0 small
enough. Although σ may depend on ε, we will see that the induced act αΓσ does not.
Hence, (νε, αΓσ) → (μ,αΓσ) ∈ graph ψSEΓ as ε → 0. Thus since, by our hypothesis, Γ ψSEΓ -
implements F under μ and μ(θ′, sθ′) > 0, we must have a = αΓσ(θ′, sθ
′
) ∈ F(θ′), which will
complete the proof.
In the following lines, we deﬁne a strategy σ and a family of system of beliefs Φ so
that σ induces an act αΓσ for which αΓσ(θ′, sθ
′
) = a. In addition, we will show that (φ, σ) is
a sequential equilibrium of Γ(νε) for some φ ∈ Φ. Φ and σ are deﬁned as follows:
Definition of Φ:
φ ∈ Φ if and only φ satisﬁes the following three properties.
Φ1. Fix any i ∈ N , any ht /∈ H∗−i,
φi
[
·|sθ′i , ht
]
= δ(θ,sθ−i)
also
supp
(
φi
[
·|sθi , ht
])
⊆ supp
(
νε
[
·|sθi
])
and for all l = i with ht ∈ H∗−l : (i.e., l has deviated)
φi[(θ, τl) | sθi , ht] = 0.
Φ2. For any i ∈ N , any ht ∈ H∗−i, any si ∈ {sθi , sθ
′
i } :
φi[·|si, ht] = νε(·|si).
Φ3. For any i ∈ N , any ht ∈ H and any sθ˜i /∈ {sθi , sθ
′
i }, we just assume that φi
[
· | sθ˜i , ht
]
=
δ
(θ˜,sθ˜−i)
where δx denotes the probability measure that puts probability 1 on {x}.
Definition of σ:
Σ1. For any player i and any ht ∈ H∗ or ht /∈ H∗−i : σi(ht, sθ
′
i ) = m
∗
i,θ(ht);
23
Σ2. For any player i and any ht ∈ H∗−i\H∗, σi(ht, sθ
′
i ) = σ
∗
i (ht, s
θ′
i ) where σ
∗
i =
σ∗i [i,H∗−i\H∗, θ′,m∗i,θ,m∗−i,θ, νε[· | sθ
′
i ]] as deﬁned in Assumption 3 and so satisﬁes:
h ∈ H∗ or h /∈ H∗−i ⇒ σ∗i (h, sθ
′
i ) = m
∗
i,θ(h);
h ∈ H∗−i\H∗ ⇒ g((σ∗i , σˆ−i);h) ν
ε(·|sθ
′
i )
i g((σ
′
i, σˆ−i);h)
for any σ
′
i that diﬀers from σ
∗
i only at h (one-shot deviation) and any σˆ−i satisfying
σˆ−i(s−i) = m∗−i,θ for any s−i with ν
ε(s−i|sθ
′
i ) > 0. This is well-deﬁned by Assump-
tion 3 because ε is small enough so that νε(θ
′
, sθ
′
−i|sθ
′
i ) ≥ 1−ξ¯(i,H∗−i\H∗, θ′,m∗i,θ,m∗−i,θ, νε[· |
sθ
′
i ]);
Σ3. For any player i and any ht ∈ H : σi(ht, sθi ) = m∗i,θ(ht);
Σ4. And for any ht ∈ H, σi(ht, sθ˜i ) = m∗θ˜,i(ht) for θ˜ = θ, θ′ where m∗θ˜ is an arbitrary
subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(θ˜). This is well-deﬁned since F is implementable
in subgame perfect equilibrium under complete information.
Note that hT [σ(sθ
′
), ∅] = hT [m∗θ, ∅] and so, σ generates an act αΓσ (that does not depend
on ε) for which αΓσ(θ′, sθ
′
) = g(σ(sθ
′
); ∅) = g(m∗θ; ∅) = a. Hence, it only remains to show
that (φ, σ) constitutes a sequential equilibrium for some φ ∈ Φ. In Section A.1, we will
show that (φ, σ) satisﬁes sequential rationality for any φ ∈ Φ; and we will also establish
that (φ, σ) satisﬁes consistency for some φ ∈ Φ in Section A.2.
A.1 Sequential rationality
Fix any φ ∈ Φ. Sequential rationality of (φ, σ) will be proved by Claims 1 and 2 below.
Claim 1 For any i ∈ N, si = sθ′i , ht ∈ H :
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for each σ′i.
Proof of Claim 1: Fix any player i. It is obvious for sθ˜i = sθi because by Φ3,
φi
[
· | sθ˜i , ht
]
= δ
(θ˜,sθ˜−i)
and so state θ˜ is common knowledge. By Σ4, we can further
conclude that σ(sθ˜) = m∗
θ˜
is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the complete information
game Γ(θ˜). Hence, we focus on the case where si = sθi . By construction, ν
ε(θ | sθi ) = 1
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and so this player knows that his preference is given by θi . The uncertainty he faces is
rather on the signals of his opponents, i.e. whether the proﬁle of signals is sθ or τk for
some k = i.
Let ht /∈ H∗−i. By Σ3 we know that σ(sθ) = m∗θ. Hence, hT [σ(sθ), ht] = hT [m∗θ, ht] and
so
g(σ(sθ);ht) = g(m∗θ;ht).
In addition, for each l = i with ht /∈ H∗−l, by Σ1 and Σ3 we know that σ−i(ht, τl) =
m∗−i,θ(ht).
23 For any history ht′ that follows ht, we must have ht′ /∈ H∗−l. By applying
again Σ1 and Σ3 we get that σ−i(τl) |ht= m∗−i,θ |ht . Hence, we obtain hT [σ(τl), ht] =
hT [m∗θ, ht] and so for each l = i with ht /∈ H∗−l, we have
g(σ(τl);ht) = g(m∗θ;ht).
In case player i deviates to σ′i, he can induce the following terminal histories: hT [σ
′
i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i), ht] =
hT [m′i,m
∗
−i,θ, ht] for some strategy m
′
i and so
g(σ′i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht) = g(m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ;ht).
In addition, for each l = i with ht /∈ H∗−l, we know that σ−i(τl) |ht= m∗−i,θ |ht . Hence,
hT [σ′i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(τl), ht] = hT [m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ, ht] and so for each l = i with ht /∈ H∗−l, we have
g(σ′i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(τl);ht) = g(m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ;ht).
Since m∗θ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the complete information game Γ(θ), we
have g(m∗θ;ht) θi g(m′i,m∗−i,θ;ht). Thus, we get g(σ(sθ);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(sθ−i);ht) and
for each l = i such that ht /∈ H∗−l : g(σ(τl);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(τl);ht). Because by Φ1,
φi[· | sθi , ht] may assign strictly positive weight only to (θ, sθ−i) and (θ, τl) for each l = i
such that ht /∈ H∗−l, we can conclude with Assumption 2
g(σ;ht) φi[·|s
θ
i ,ht]
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht).
Let ht ∈ H∗−i. Let us distinguish two cases. First, assume that ht ∈ H∗−i\H∗. Since
ht ∈ H∗−i and ht /∈ H∗, there must exist t′ < t such that σi(ht′ , sθi ) = m∗i,θ(ht′) where ht′
23We abuse the notation because we should use σ−i(τl\sθi , ht) instead of σ−i(τl, ht). This abuse will be
used at several places in the paper.
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is a truncation of history ht. Then, for any history ht′′ following ht′ (and so in particular,
following ht), we have ht′′ /∈ H∗−k for each k = i. By Σ1 and Σ3, we thus obtain σ(ht′′ , sθ) =
σ(ht′′ , τk) = m∗θ(ht′′) for each k = i. Hence, for each k = i we have hT [σ(sθ), ht] =
hT [σ(τk), ht] = hT [m∗θ, ht], which further implies
g(σ(sθ);ht) = g(σ(τk);ht) = g(m∗θ;ht).
Consider the case where player i deviates to σ′i. Here, Σ1 and Σ3 allow us to conclude that
for each k = i, player i can induce the following terminal histories: hT [σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(sθ−i), ht] =
hT [σ′i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(τk), ht] = hT [m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ, ht] for some strategy m
′
i, which implies
g(σ′i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht) = g(σ
′
i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(τk);ht) = g(m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ;ht).
Since m∗θ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the complete information game Γ(θ), we al-
ready have g(m∗θ ;ht) θi g(m′i,m∗−i,θ;ht). Thus, we also get g(σ(sθ);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(sθ−i);ht)
and g(σ(τk);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(τk);ht) for each k = i. Now, since by Φ2 we know that
φi[· | sθi , ht] assigns a strictly positive weight only to (θ, sθ−i) and (θ, τk) for each k = i, we
can conclude with Assumption 2
g(σ, ht) φi[·|s
θ
i ;ht]
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht).
Consider now the second case where ht ∈ H∗. Note that ht+1 = (ht, σ(ht, sθ)) =
(ht, σ(ht, τk)) = (ht,m∗θ(ht)) = h
∗
t+1 ∈ H∗ where the second and third equalities are
assured by Σ1 and Σ3 and we use the fact that ht ∈ H∗. Similar argument can be
made inductively so that any subsequent history also falls into H∗. Thus, hT [σ(sθ), ht] =
hT [σ(τk), ht] = hT [m∗θ, ht], and so we obtain
g(σ(sθ);ht) = g(σ(τk);ht) = g(m∗θ;ht).
Now consider that player i deviates to σ′i. Let tˆ ≥ t be the ﬁrst date at which σ′i(htˆ, sθi ) =
σi(htˆ, s
θ
i ); or equivalently, σ
′
i(htˆ, s
θ
i ) = m∗i,θ(htˆ). As above, one can inductively show that as
long as t′ < tˆ, we obtain ht′+1 = (ht′ , σ′i(ht′ , s
θ
i ), σ−i(ht′ , s
θ
−i)) = (ht′ , σ
′
i(ht′ , s
θ
i ), σ−i(ht′ , τk)) =
(ht′ ,m∗i,θ(ht′),m
∗
−i,θ(ht′)) ∈ H∗ for each k = i where the second and third equalities are
assured by Σ1 and Σ3 and we use the fact that ht′ ∈ H∗. In addition, ht′+1 /∈ H∗−k
for each k = i and t′ ≥ tˆ. Hence, for t′ ≥ tˆ, ht′+1 = (ht′ , σ′i(ht′ , sθi ), σ−i(ht′ , sθ−i)) =
(ht′ , σ′i(ht′ , s
θ
i ), σ−i(ht′ , τk)) = (ht′ , σ
′
i(ht′ , s
θ
i ),m
∗
−i,θ(ht′)) for each k = i where the second
and third equalities are assured by Σ1 and Σ3 and we use the fact that ht′ /∈ H∗−k for
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each k = i. So we get hT [σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(sθ−i), ht] = hT [σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(τk), ht] = hT [m′i,m∗−i,θ, ht]
for some strategy m′i, which implies
g(σ′i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht) = g(σ
′
i(s
θ
i ), σ−i(τk);ht) = g(m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ;ht).
Here again, since m∗θ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the complete information game
Γ(θ), we have g(m∗θ;ht) θi g(m′i,m∗−i,θ;ht). Thus, we get g(σ(sθ);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(sθ−i);ht)
and g(σ(τk);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθi ), σ−i(τk);ht) for each k = i. Now since by Φ2, φi[· | sθi , ht] may
assign strictly positive weight only to (θ, sθ−i) and (θ, τk) for each k = i, we can conclude
with Assumption 2
g(σ;ht) φi[·|s
θ
i ,ht]
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht).
This completes the proof. 
Claim 2 For any i ∈ N, si = sθ′i , and ht ∈ H :
g(σ, ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i), ht)
for each σ′i.
Proof of Claim 2: This claim will be proved by studying three diﬀerent cases depend-
ing on the type of history we consider: (1) ht /∈ H∗−i; (2) ht ∈ H∗; and (3) ht ∈ H∗−i\H∗.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case (1) ht /∈ H∗−i. By Σ3 we know that σ−i(sθ−i) = m∗−i,θ.
In addition, for any history ht′ following ht, we have ht′ /∈ H∗−i. Thus, by Σ1, we ob-
tain σi(ht′ , sθ
′
i ) = m
∗
i,θ(ht′) for any subsequent history ht′ . This further implies that
hT [σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ
−i), ht] = hT [m
∗
θ, ht] and so we obtain
g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ
−i);ht) = g(m
∗
θ;ht).
Consider that player i deviates to σ′i. Then, we have hT [σ
′
i(s
θ′
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i), ht] = hT [m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ, ht]
for some strategy m′i. Hence, we obtain
g(σ′i(s
θ′
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht) = g(m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ;ht).
Since m∗θ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the complete information game Γ(θ), we have
g(m∗θ;ht) θi g(m′i,m∗−i,θ;ht). Thus, we also get g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ
−i);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθ
′
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht).
Because by Φ1, φi[(θ, sθ−i) | sθ
′
i , ht] = 1, we can conclude with Assumption 2
g(σ;ht) φi[·|s
θ′
i ,ht]
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht).
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Consider now the case (2) ht ∈ H∗. Note that ht+1 = (ht, σ(ht, sθ′i , sθ
′
−i)) = (ht, σ(ht, s
θ′
i , s
θ
−i)) =
(ht,m∗θ(ht)) = h
∗
t+1 ∈ H∗ where the second and third equalities are assured by Σ1
and Σ3 and we use the fact that ht ∈ H∗. Similar argument can be made inductively
so that any subsequent history also falls into H∗. Hence we have hT [σ(sθ′i , sθ
′
−i), ht] =
hT [σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ
−i), ht] = hT [m
∗
θ, ht], which implies
g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ′
−i);ht) = g(σ(s
θ′
i , s
θ
−i);ht) = g(m
∗
θ;ht).
Now consider that player i deviates to σ′i. Let tˆ ≥ t be the ﬁrst date at which σ′i(htˆ, sθ
′
i ) =
σi(htˆ, s
θ′
i ); or equivalently, σ
′
i(htˆ, s
θ′
i ) = m∗i,θ(htˆ). As above, similar argument would show
that as long as t′ < tˆ, we have ht′+1 = (ht′ , σ′i(ht′ , s
θ′
i ), σ−i(ht′ , s
θ′
−i)) = (ht′ , σ
′
i(ht′ , s
θ′
i ), σ−i(ht′ , s
θ
−i)) =
(ht′ ,m∗i,θ(ht′),m
∗
−i,θ(ht′)) ∈ H∗ where the second and third equalities are assured by Σ1
and Σ3 and we use the fact that ht′ ∈ H∗. In addition, htˆ+1 = (htˆ, σ′i(htˆ, sθ
′
i ), σ−i(htˆ, s
θ′
−i)) =
(htˆ, σ
′
i(htˆ, s
θ′
i ), σ−i(htˆ, s
θ
−i)) = (htˆ, σ
′
i(htˆ, s
θ′
i ),m
∗
−i,θ(htˆ)) where the second and third equal-
ities are assured by Σ1 and Σ3 and we use the fact that htˆ ∈ H∗. Note that ht′ /∈
H∗−k for each k = i and for t′ ≥ tˆ + 1. Therefore, using an inductive argument, one
can show that ht′+1 = (ht′ , σ′i(ht′ , s
θ′
i ), σ−i(ht′ , s
θ′
−i)) = (ht′ , σ
′
i(ht′ , s
θ′
i ), σ−i(ht′ , s
θ
−i)) =
(ht′ , σ′i(ht′ , s
θ′
i ),m
∗
−i,θ(ht′)) where the second and third equalities are assured by Σ1 and
Σ3 and we use the fact that ht′ /∈ H∗−k for each k = i. So we get hT [σ′i(sθ
′
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i), ht] =
hT (σ′i(s
θ′
i ), σ−i(s
θ′
−i), ht] = hT [m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ, ht] for some strategy m
′
i, which implies
g(σ′i(s
θ′
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht) = g(σ
′
i(s
θ′
i ), σ−i(s
θ′
−i);ht) = g(m
′
i,m
∗
−i,θ;ht). (1)
Here again, since m∗θ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the complete information game
Γ(θ), we have g(m∗θ ;ht) θi g(m′i,m∗−i,θ;ht). Thus, we also get
g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ
−i);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθ
′
i ), σ−i(s
θ
−i);ht). (2)
The above preference relation together with (1) also implies
g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ′
−i);ht) θi g(σ′i(sθ
′
i ), σ−i(s
θ′
−i);ht).
Since g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ′
−i);ht) = g(m
∗
θ;h
∗
t ) = a and we have assumed that θ and θ′ are two states
satisfying (∗), we get that
g(σ(sθ
′
i , s
θ′
−i);ht) θ
′
i g(σ
′
i(s
θ′
i ), σ−i(s
θ′
−i);ht). (3)
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Now since by Φ2, φi[· | sθ′i , ht] assigns a strictly positive weight only to (θ, sθ−i) and (θ′, sθ
′
−i),
Assumption 2 together with (2) and (3) yields:
g(σ;ht) φi[·|s
θ′
i ,ht]
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht).
Finally consider the case (3) ht ∈ H∗−i\H∗. Since ht ∈ H∗−i and ht /∈ H∗ (only i
has deviated up to t), there must exist t′ < t such that σi(ht′ , sθ
′
i ) = m∗i,θ(ht′) where
ht′ is a truncation of history ht. Then, for any history ht′′ following ht′ (and so, in
particular, following ht), we have ht′′ /∈ H∗−k for each k = i. Moreover, by Σ1 and Σ3 we
have σ−i(ht′′, sθ−i) = σ−i(ht′′, s
θ′
−i) = m
∗
−i,θ(ht′′). Otherwise stated, we have σ−i(s
θ
−i) |ht=
σ−i(sθ
′
−i) |ht= m∗−i,θ |ht . By Φ2 we know that φi[· | sθ
′
i , ht] = ν
ε(· | sθ′i ) assigns a strictly
positive weight only to (θ, sθ−i) and (θ
′, sθ′−i). In addition, we have that for any h ∈ H∗ or
h /∈ H∗−i : σi(h, sθ
′
i ) = m
∗
i,θ(h, s
θ′
i ). Since ht ∈ H∗−i\H∗, we conclude with Σ2
g((σi, σ−i);ht) ν
ε(·|sθ
′
i )
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht)
for any σ
′
i that diﬀers from σi only at ht. By Assumption 4, we can apply the one-shot
deviation principle, and so the above is equivalent to
g((σi, σ−i);ht) ν
ε(·|sθ
′
i )
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht)
for any σ
′
i. This completes the proof. 
A.2 Consistency
In this section, we show that for some φ ∈ Φ, (φ, σ) satisﬁes consistency.
To show this part, we ﬁrst ﬁx σ as deﬁned above and consider the following sequence
{(φk, σk)}∞k=0 of assessments. Let ηk > 0 for each k and ηk → 0 as k →∞. For each player
i, ht ∈ H, and signal si, let ξi(ht, si, ·) be any strictly positive prior over Mi(ht)\{σi(si, ht)}
and deﬁne σki as
σki (m
t
i | ht, sθ
′
i ) =
{
1− ηT×nk if mti = σi(ht, sθ
′
i );
ηT×nk × ξi(ht, sθ
′
i ,m
t
i) otherwise
where T is the (ﬁnite) length of the longest ﬁnal history; and for any signal si = sθ′i :
σki (m
t
i | ht, si) =
{
1− ηk if mti = σi(ht, si);
ηk × ξi(ht, si,mti) otherwise
.
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Let φk be the unique Bayes consistent belief associated with each σk. It is easy to check
that σk converges to σ and we also have that φk converges24. Let φ ≡ limk→∞ φk. In
the sequel, we show that φ satisﬁes Φ1, Φ2 and Φ3. This will show that (φ, σ) satisﬁes
consistency, and φ ∈ Φ as claimed.
To do so, we explicitly compute each φk and study its limit as k tends to inﬁnity. In
general for each (θ˜, s˜−i) ∈ Θ × S−i, each ht = (m1, ...,mt−1) ∈ H, and each s˜i ∈ Si, we
have
φki [(θ˜, s˜−i) | s˜i, ht] =
νε(θ˜, s˜−i, s˜i)×
∏t−1
t′=1
[
σk(mt
′ | ht′ , s˜)
]
∑
(θ′,s′−i)
νε(θ′, s′−i, s˜i)×
∏t−1
t′=1
[
σk(mt′ | ht′ , s′−i, s˜i)
] .
In the above formula for each t′ ≤ t, ht′ stands for the truncation of ht to the ﬁrst t′
elements i.e., ht′ = (m1, ...,mt
′−1).
Claim 3 φ satisﬁes Φ1.
Proof of Claim 3: Consider player i, ht /∈ H∗−i. First, we will establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Fix player i and assume that for all j = i, let sj ∈ {sθj , sθ
′
j }. Let ht =
(∅,m1, ...,mt−1) /∈ H∗−i.
(1) There exists jˆ = i and tˆ ≤ t− 1 such that σjˆ(htˆ, sjˆ) = mtˆjˆ;
(2) If ht ∈ H∗−l for some l = i, then there exists tˆ ≤ t− 1 such that σl(htˆ, sl) = mtˆl .
Proof of Lemma 2: (1) Assume, on the contrary, that σ−i(ht′ , s−i) = mt
′
−i for all
t′ ≤ t − 1. We then show by induction that for all t′ ≤ t, ht′ ∈ H∗−i, which yields a
contradiction. Let t′ = 1; in this case, h1 = ∅ ∈ H∗ ⊆ H∗−i. Now, toward an induction,
assume that ht′−1 ∈ H∗−i and let us show that ht′ ∈ H∗−i. It is easy to show that ht′−1 ∈ H∗−i
implies that either ht′−1 ∈ H∗ (i.e., no player has deviated) or ht′−1 /∈ H∗−j for all j = i
(i.e., only i has deviated). However, in either case, σ−i(ht′−1, s−i) = m∗−i,θ(ht′−1) is
obtained by Σ1 and Σ3. Since we have assumed that σ−i(ht′−1, s−i) = mt
′−1
−i , we get
mt
′−1
−i = m
∗
−i,θ(ht′−1), which proves that ht′ = (ht′−1, (m˜i(ht′−1),m
∗
−i,θ(ht′−1)) for some
strategy m˜i and so ht′ ∈ H∗−i. This is a contradiction as desired. (2) Since ht ∈ H∗−l, we
24As will become clear from the proof, the sequence {φk}k does converge.
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have that, for all j = l and all t′ ≤ t− 1, mt′j = m∗j,θ(ht′). Since ht /∈ H∗−i, we must have
that ht ∈ H∗−l\H∗. Let t˜ ≤ t−1 be the ﬁrst date at which mt˜l = m∗l,θ(ht˜). By construction,
we have that for all t′ ≤ t˜, ht′ ∈ H∗ while for all t′ > t˜, ht′ /∈ H∗−j for all j = l. This
implies that for all j = l and t′ ≤ t−1, we have σj(ht′ , sj) = m∗j,θ(ht′) by Σ1 and Σ3. This
further implies that for all j = l and t′ ≤ t− 1, σj(ht′ , sj) = mt′j . As we already proved in
(1), we must have the existence of tˆ ≤ t− 1 such that σl(htˆ, sl) = mtˆl , as claimed. 
The rest of the proof is reduced to checking the following two cases:
Case 1: si = sθ
′
i . Recall that ν
ε(·, sθ′i ) assigns a weight strictly positive only to
(θ′, sθ′−i) and (θ, s
θ
−i). Hence,
φki [(θ, s
θ
−i) | sθ
′
i , ht]
=
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
+ νε(θ′, sθ′−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j )
]
=
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ′
i )
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ′
i ) + νε(θ′, s
θ′
−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
 t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j |ht′ ,sθ
′
j )]∏
j =i
[
 t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j |ht′ ,sθj )]
We now show that the ratio
∏
j =i
[
∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j )]
/ ∏
j =i
[
∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)] tends
to 0 as k tends to inﬁnity. This will show that φki [(θ, s
θ
−i) | sθ
′
i , ht] → 1 and φki [(θ′, sθ
′
−i) |
sθ
′
i , ht] → 0.
By construction of σk, Lemma 2 (1) implies that for some jˆ = i and tˆ ≤ t− 1 :
σkjˆ (m
tˆ
jˆ | htˆ, sθ
′
jˆ ) = η
T×n
k ξjˆ(htˆ, s
θ′
jˆ ,m
tˆ
jˆ). (4)
Now, we have:
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j )
]
∏
j =i
[∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
] ≤ ηT×nk × ξjˆ(htˆ, sθ′jˆ ,mtˆjˆ)× 1∏
j =i
[∏t−1
t′=1 ηkξj(ht′ , s
θ
j ,m
t′
j )
]
=
ηT×nk
η
(t−1)(n−1)
k
× ξjˆ(htˆ, s
θ′
jˆ ,m
tˆ
jˆ)∏
j =i
[∏t−1
t′=1 ξj(ht′ , s
θ
j ,m
t′
j )
] → 0 (as k →∞).
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Where the ﬁrst inequality is assured by (4) and (assuming wlog that ηk is small) we use
the very construction that, for all j and t′ ≤ t− 1, σkj (mt
′
j | ht′ , sθj) ≥ ηk × ξj(ht′ , sθj ,mt
′
j ).
Case 2: si = sθi . Recall that ν
ε(·, sθi ) assigns a weight strictly positive only to
(θ, sθ−i) and (θ, τl) for each l = i. Hence,
φki [(θ, τl) | sθi , ht]
=
νε(θ, τl)×
∏
j =l,i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
×
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθ
′
l )
]
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
z =i
νε(θ, τz)×
∏
j =z,i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
×
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkz (mt
′
z | ht′ , sθ
′
z )
]
+νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
=
νε(θ, τl)
∑
z =i
νε(θ, τz)× cz(k) + νε(θ, sθ−i, sθi )×
t−1
 
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l |ht′ ,sθl )
t−1
 
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l |ht′ ,sθ
′
l )
for some positive functions cz(k). We now show that if ht ∈ H∗−l, then the ratio∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
l (m
t′
l , ht′ , s
θ
l )
/∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
l (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθ
′
l ) tends to ∞ as k tends to inﬁnity. This will
show that φki [(θ, τl) | sθi , ht] → 0 for all l such that ht ∈ H∗−l; and hence that φ satisﬁes
Φ1. Assume that ht ∈ H∗−l for some l, by construction of σk, Lemma 2 (2) implies that
there exists tˆ ≤ t− 1 such that σl(htˆ, sl) = mtˆl and so:
σkl (m
tˆ
l | htˆ, sθ
′
l ) = η
T×n
k ξl(htˆ, s
θ′
l ,m
tˆ
l). (5)
Now, we have
t−1∏
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθl )
t−1∏
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθ
′
l )
≥
ηt−1k
t−1∏
t′=1
ξl(ht′ , sθl ,m
t′
l )
ηT×nk ξl(htˆ, s
θ′
l ,m
tˆ
l)× 1
→∞ (as k →∞).
Where the ﬁrst inequality is assured by (5) and (assuming wlog that ηk is small) we use
the fact that by construction: for all t′ ≤ t− 1 : σkl (mt
′
j | ht′ , sθl ) ≥ ηk × ξl(ht′ , sθl ,mt
′
l ). 
Claim 4 φ satisﬁes Φ2.
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Proof of Claim 4: Consider player i, ht ∈ H∗−i. The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 3 Fix player i and assume that for all j = i, sj ∈ {sθj , sθ
′
j }. Let ht = (∅,m1, ...,mt−1) ∈
H∗−i. For all j = i and t′ ≤ t− 1 : σj(ht′ , sj) = mt
′
j .
Proof of Lemma 3: Pick any t′ ≤ t− 1 and note that ht′ ∈ H∗−i. Hence, it must be
that either ht′ ∈ H∗ or ht′ /∈ H∗−j for all j = i. In each of these cases, by Σ1 and Σ3, we
have for all j = i : σj(ht′ , sj) = m∗j,θ(ht′). Since ht′ ∈ H∗−i, we have that, for all j = i,
mt
′
j = m
∗
j,θ(ht′), which completes the proof. 
Here again, the rest of the proof is reduced to checking the following two cases.
Case 1: si = sθ
′
i . Recall that ν
ε(·, sθ′i ) assigns a weight strictly positive only to
(θ′, sθ′−i) and (θ, s
θ
−i). Hence,
φki [(θ
′, sθ
′
−i) | sθ
′
i , ht]
=
νε(θ′, sθ′−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j )
]
νε(θ′, sθ′)×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j )
]
+ νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
=
νε(θ′, sθ′−i, s
θ′
i )
νε(θ′, sθ′) + νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ′
i )×
∏
j =i
[
 t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j |ht′ ,sθj )]∏
j =i
[
 t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j |ht′ ,sθ
′
j )]
We now show that the ratio
∏
j =i
∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
/ ∏
j =i
∏t−1
t′=1 σ
k
j (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j ) tends to
1 as k tends to inﬁnity. This will show that φki [(θ
′, sθ′−i) | sθ
′
i , ht] → νε((θ′, sθ
′
−i) | sθ
′
i ) and
φki [(θ, s
θ
−i) | sθ
′
i , ht] → νε((θ, sθ−i) | sθ
′
i ).
By construction of σk, Lemma 3 implies that for all j = i and t′ ≤ t− 1 :
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj) = 1− ηk and σkj (mt
′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j ) = 1− ηT×nk
Thus,
∏
j =i
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
/∏
j =i
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθ
′
j )→ 1 as k →∞
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Case 2: si = sθi . Recall that ν
ε(·, sθi ) assigns a weight strictly positive only to
(θ, sθ−i) and (θ, τl) for l = i. Hence,
φki [(θ, s
θ
−i) | sθi , ht]
=
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ
i )×
∏
j =i
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
+
∑
l =i
νε(θ, τl)×
∏
j =i,l
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkj (m
t′
j | ht′ , sθj)
]
×
[
t−1∏
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθ
′
l )
]
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
=
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ
i )
νε(θ, sθ−i, s
θ
i ) +
∑
l =i
νε(θ, τl)×
 t−1
t′=1 σ
k
l (m
t′
l |ht′ ,sθ
′
l )
 t−1
t′=1 σ
k
l (m
t′
l |ht′ ,sθl )
We now show that for each l = i, the ratio∏t−1t′=1[σkl (mt′l | ht′ , sθ′l )]
/∏t−1
t′=1[σ
k
l (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθl )]
tends to 1 as k tends to inﬁnity. This will show that φki [(θ, s
θ
−i) | sθi , ht]→ νε((θ, sθ−i) | sθi )
and similar reasoning shows that for each l = i : φki [(θ, τl) | sθi , ht] → νε((θ, τl) | sθi ); and
hence, φ satisﬁes Φ2.
By construction of σk, Lemma 3 implies that for all l = i and t′ ≤ t− 1 :
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθl ) = 1− ηk and σkl (mt
′
l | ht′ , sθ
′
l ) = 1− ηT×nk
Thus,
t−1∏
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθ
′
l )
/
t−1∏
t′=1
σkl (m
t′
l | ht′ , sθl )→ 1 as k →∞

Finally, observing that for sθ˜i /∈ {sθi , sθ
′
i }, νε(·, sθ˜i ) assigns a weight one to (θ˜, sθ˜−i), we
establish the claim below:
Claim 5 φ satisﬁes Φ3.
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B One-Shot Deviation Principle
As already mentioned, Hendon, Jacobsen and Sloth (1996) proved the one-shot deviation
principle for sequential equilibrium when players are expected utility decision makers. In
this section, we show that in our setting where agents need not be expected utility decision
makers, under two weak additional assumptions (obviously satisﬁed by expected utility
models), the one-shot deviation principle holds.
To state the assumptions, assume that one dimension – say Y – is added to the state
space. We will have to deﬁne order of preferences over this extended domain. We say that
αY is a Y -act if αY is a mapping from Θ × S × Y to A. We assume that for each belief
β ∈ Δ(Θ× S × Y ), each player i has a transitive preference relation βi over Y -acts.
We make two weak assumptions that hold in the expected utility case. The ﬁrst
assumption is in the spirit of Assumption 2 in the paper and imposes a weak restriction
on preference orders when the domain of acts is extended from Θ× S to Θ× S × Y .
Assumption 5 Fix any countable set Y and take two Y -acts αY and αˆY , and a belief
β ∈ Δ(Θ× S × Y ). We have(
α(·, ·, y) β(·,·|y)i αˆ(·, ·, y) for all y s.t. β(y) > 0
)
⇒ α βi αˆ.
The second assumption is also very weak. First, we say that a Y -act αY coincides with
an act α under β ∈ Δ(Θ× S × Y ) if for any θ, s, y : β(θ, s, y) > 0⇒ αY (θ, s, y) = α(θ, s).
The following assumption only assumes that if under β, αY and αˆY respectively coincide
with acts α and αˆ, then the uncertainty dimension Y can be ignored. More precisely:
Assumption 6 Fix any countable set Y and take two Y -acts αY and αˆY , and a belief
β ∈ Δ(Θ×S×Y ). Assume that αY and αˆY respectively coincide with acts α and αˆ under
β. We have
αY βi αˆY ⇒ α margΘ×S βi αˆ.
For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that (1) for all player i and h /∈
HT : |Mi(h)| ≥ 1 and (2) any terminal histories h, h′ ∈ HT have the same length T . 25
25This is without loss of generality because assuming that player i does not play after history h (i.e.
assuming that Mi(h) = ∅), or assuming that player i has a unique available message after history h, (i.e.
|Mi(h)| = 1) is essentially the same: this does not aﬀect the sequential equilibrium outcomes. Hence,
assuming that all terminal histories have the same length T is also without loss of generality.
35
Proposition 1 (One-Shot Deviation Principle) Suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 hold.
Let (φ, σ) be an assessment that satisﬁes consistency. For each i, si, t and ht :
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for every σ′i if and only if for each i, si, t and ht :
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for every σ′i that diﬀers from σi only at ht.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We will ﬁrst need the following claim.
Claim 6 Let ht+1 = (ht,mt) where mt ∈ M(ht). We have for each i and si
φi(θ, s−i | si, ht)σ(mt | ht, si, s−i) =
⎛
⎝∑
s˜−i
φi[s˜−i | si, ht]σ(mt | ht, si, s˜−i)
⎞
⎠φi(θ, s−i | si, ht+1).
Proof. In case
∑
s˜−i
φi[s˜−i | si, ht]σ(mt | ht, si, s˜−i) = 0 then the right-hand side is zero
but obviously so is the left-hand side. Now assume
∑
s˜−i
φi[s˜−i | si, ht]σ(mt | ht, si, s˜−i) > 0.
By consistency, we can pick the sequence of totally mixed strategy proﬁle σk → σ such
that (recall that for each t′ ≤ t, ht′ = (m1,m2, ...,mt′−1) stands for the truncation of ht
to the ﬁrst t′ elements)
φi(θ, s−i | ht, si)σ(mt | ht, si, s−i)∑
s˜−i
φi[s˜−i | si, ht]σ(mt | ht, si, s˜−i)
= lim
k→∞
ν(θ, s−i, si)×
t−1∏
t′=1
σk−i(m
t′
−i | ht′ , s−i)
∑
θ,s′−i
ν(θ, s′−i, si)×
t−1∏
t′=1
σk−i(m
t′
−i | ht′ , s′−i)
× σ−i(mt−i | ht, s−i)
/
lim
k→∞
∑
s˜−i
ν(s˜−i, si)×
t−1∏
t′=1
σk−i(m
t′
−i | ht′ , s˜−i)
∑
s′−i
ν(s′−i, si)×
t−1∏
t′=1
σk−i(m
t′
−i | ht′ , s′−i)
× σ−i(mt−i | ht, s˜−i)
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= lim
k→∞
ν(θ, s−i, si)×
t−1∏
t′=1
σk−i(m
t′
−i | ht′ , s−i)× σ−i(mt−i | ht, s−i)
∑
s˜−i
ν(s˜−i, si)×
t−1∏
t′=1
σk−i(m
t′
−i | ht′ , s˜−i)× σ−i(mt−i | ht, s˜−i)
= φi(θ, s−i | ht+1, si)
as claimed.
We are now in a position to prove our Proposition 1.
Assume (φ, σ) satisﬁes local sequential rationality, i.e. for each i, si, t and ht :
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for every σ′i that diﬀers from σi only at ht.
Fix any i, si. Recall that T is the length of any terminal history. We want to show by
induction on k that for any k ≥ 1 and any t ≥ T − k, any ht satisﬁes:
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
for any strategy σ′i. First, note that this is true for k = 1 because (φ, σ) satisﬁes local
sequential rationality. Now toward an induction, assume (IH) that for any t′ ≥ T − k, any
ht′ satisﬁes
g(σ;ht′ ) φi[·|si,ht′ ]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht′)
for any strategy σ′i. Pick any ht such that t ≥ T − (k + 1) and ﬁx any strategy σ′i. By
local sequential rationality, we know that
g(σ;ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σˆi, σ−i);ht)
for σˆi(h) =
{
σ′i(h) if h = ht
σi(h) otherwise
; hence, by transitivity of φi[·|si,ht]i , it is enough to show
that
g((σˆi, σ−i);ht) φi[·|si,ht]i g((σ′i, σ−i);ht). (6)
For any proﬁle of strategies σ, let the M(ht)-act g˜(σ;ht) : Θ × S ×M(ht) → A be such
that (θ, s,mt) → g(σi(si), σ−i(s−i);ht,mt); and let φ˜i[· | si, ht] be the distribution over
Θ× S ×M(ht) such that
φ˜i[(θ, s,mt) | si, ht] = φi[(θ, s−i) | si, ht]σ′i(mti | ht, si)σ−i(mt−i | ht, s−i).
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Note that φ˜i[(θ, s,mt) | si, ht] > 0 implies that26 σ′i(si, ht) = mti and σ−i(s−i, ht) = mt−i.
Hence, whenever φ˜i[(θ, s,mt) | si, ht] > 0 :
g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht)(θ, s,mt) = g(σˆi(si), σ−i(s−i);ht, σ′i(ht, si), σ−i(ht, s−i))
= g(σˆi(si), σ−i(s−i);ht)
where the ﬁrst equality is by deﬁnition of g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht) while the second is by deﬁnition
of σˆi. Thus, the M(ht)-act g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht) coincides with the act g((σˆi, σ−i);ht) under
φ˜i[· | si, ht]. Similarly, one can easily check that the M(ht)-act g˜((σ′i, σ−i);ht) coincides
with the act g((σ′i, σ−i);ht) under φ˜i[· | si, ht]. Now, Assumption 6 together with the fact
that φ[· | si, ht] = margΘ×S−iφ˜[· | si, ht] implies that (6) holds if
g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht) φ˜i[·|si,ht]i g˜((σ′i, σ−i);ht).
By Claim 6, we know that for any mt :
φ˜i[(θ, s,mt) | si, ht] =
⎛
⎝∑
s˜−i
φi[s˜−i | si, ht]σ′i(mti | ht, si)σ−i(mt−i | ht, s˜−i)
⎞
⎠φi(θ, s−i | si, ht,mt).
(7)
In addition, because ht has been chosen so that t + 1 ≥ T − k, the inductive hypothesis
(IH) applies to ht+1 = (ht,mt) i.e.
g((σi, σ−i);ht,mt) φi[·|si,ht,m
t]
i g((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht,m
t). (8)
Now, it is clear that g((σ′i, σ−i);ht,m
t) = g˜((σ′i, σ−i);ht)(·, ·,mt); in addition, by deﬁnition
of σˆi, g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht)(·, ·,mt) = g((σi, σ−i);ht,mt). Thus, by (8), we get that for any
mt ∈ M(ht) :
g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht)(·, ·,mt) φi[·|si,ht,m
t]
i g˜((σ
′
i, σ−i);ht)(·, ·,mt) (9)
Therefore, by (7), it is easily checked that φ[· | si, ht] is equal to φ˜[· | si, ht] conditional on
mt. Hence, using (9) and Assumption 5, we get that
g˜((σˆi, σ−i);ht) φ˜i[·|si,ht]i g˜((σ′i, σ−i);ht)
which completes the proof.
26Recall that we consider only pure strategies.
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